In this paper, we study natural language constructions which were first examined by Barwise: The richer the country, the more powerful some of its officials. Guided by Barwise’s observations, we suggest that conceivable interpretations of such constructions express the existence of various similarities between partial orders such as homomorphism or embedding. Semantically, we interpret the constructions as polyadic generalized quantifiers restricted to finite models. We extend the results obtained by Barwise by showing that similarity quantifiers are not expressible in elementary (...) logic over finite models. We also investigate whether the proposed readings are sound from the cognitive perspective. We prove that almost all similarity quantifiers are intractable. This leads us to first-order variants, which only approximate the strong readings, but are cognitively more plausible. Driven by the question of ambiguity, we recall Barwise’s argumentation in favour of strong readings, enriching it with some arguments of our own. Given that Barwise-like sentences are indeed ambiguous, we use a generalized Strong Meaning Hypothesis to derive predictions for their verification. Finally, we propose a hypothesis according to which conflicting pressures of communication and cognition might give rise to an ambiguous construction, provided that different semantic variants of the construction withstand different pressures involved in its usage. (shrink)

Considering the large number of adverts inundating the average consumer every day, the marketing industry is seeking methods to reach clients in a more subtle manner than traditional marketing messages. One such tool is product placement. The article addresses issues of effectiveness of product placement in comparison to a traditional commercial. The objective of the study was to check how participants would recall the content of persuasive messages in conditions of artificially-inducted cognitive load (in conditions of traditional advertisement and product (...) placement). Two studies were conducted – a pilot study intended to assess the usefulness of the selected stimuli, and the main experiment. The experiment devoted to this question was planned using an ANOVA scheme 2 (Type of advert: traditional vs. product placement) x 2 (neutral conditions vs. cognitive load). It turned out that the commercial was better retained in neutral conditions than in conditions of cognitive load. The traditional commercial was remembered better than product placement. From the perspective of the study’s ecological validity, of importance is also comparison of retention of brands viewed in a traditional commercial in conditions of cognitive load with retention of brands in conditions of product placement without load. These comparisons indicate the superiority of product placement – brands presented in this manner were more frequently recalled by viewers. (shrink)

Tomasz Mann umieścił w Czarodziejskiej górze zdanie, które ma swoją historię. Wspomniał, że jego bohater Hans Castorp spędził cztery semestry jako student budowy okrętów na gdańskiej Politechnice. Zafascynowany tym zdaniem – i co nie bez znaczenia – urodzony w Gdańsku pisarz Paweł Huelle napisał powieść o gdańskim epizodzie bohatera Tomasza Manna, której nadał tytuł Castorp. Artykuł wskazuje na najistotniejsze motywy obu tych powieści w perspektywie pytania o ideę kultury. Jak wiadomo jedną z najważniejszych inspiracji w twórczości Manna jest filozofia (...) Artura Schopenhauera. Jego metafizykę woli, grę sił płodzenia i unicestwiania, uznaje Mann za projekt bardzo atrakcyjny artystycznie. Jednak projekt, który w ostatecznym rezultacie musi przynieść roztopienie jednostki w bezforemnym świecie metafizycznej woli, jest w ocenie Manna wrogi życiu i stanowi zagrożenie dla form kultury. Castorp, bohater literacki wydany na działanie ciemnych i ślepych sił woli, jest przykładem człowieka, który przyjmuje ten fakt do wiadomości, ale staje po stronie życia. Podejmuje próbę okiełznania tych sił i nadania im cywilizowanej i bardziej przyjaznej człowiekowi formy. Jest to próba walki o wartość życia, która w interpretacji Manna posiada charakter etyczny. W świetle filozofii Heinricha Rickerta bohater literacki Castorp to człowiek, który dąży do ulepszenia własnej natury i widzi w tym zadanie, które spełnia się w obszarze kultury. Swoje postępowanie i działanie chce podporządkować normom i trwałym wartościom, przyjmując tę postawę za nadrzędny imperatyw etyczny. Dąży do wypracowania pozaczasowych wartości jako przeciwwagi dla metafizycznego bytu woli. W szerszym kontekście obrazuje to proces, w którym transcendentny byt zostaje zastąpiony przez „transcendentną powinność”. (shrink)

Przedmiotem artykułu jest recepcja filozofii Schopenhauera w Czarodziejskiej górze – najbardziej znanej powieści Tomasza Manna. Wpływ Schopenhauera na twórczość Manna jest sprawą znaną i omawianą w różnych kontekstach przez historyków literatury niemieckiej. W tym przypadku relacja głównych protagonistów powieści Hansa Castorpa i Kławdii Chauchat, zostaje przedstawiona jako literacka „ilustracja” doktryny filozofa. Tomasz Mann posługuje się „mistyką ciała” jako próbą doświadczenia Schopenhauerowskiej transcendencji. Analogiczną funkcję w oparciu o estetykę Schopenhauera wypełnia w powieści muzyka. Czarodziejska góra zostaje ukazana jako przykład koncepcji (...) artystycznej wyrosłej z systemu filozofa, choć traktowany jest on raczej jako punkt wyjścia, a nie jako cel. (shrink)

Its interpretation, however, is as unsettled now as in the heroic days of Einstein and Bohr.This book focuses on quantum non-locality, the curious quantum ...

General metaphysical arguments have been proposed in favour of the thesis that all dispositions have categorical bases (Armstrong; Prior, Pargetter, Jackson). These arguments have been countered by equally general arguments in support of ungrounded dispositions (Molnar, Mumford). I believe that this controversy cannot be settled purely on the level of abstract metaphysical considerations. Instead, I propose to look for ungrounded dispositions in specific physical theories, such as quantum mechanics. I explain why non-classical properties such as spin are best interpreted as (...) irreducible dispositional properties, and I give reasons why even seemingly classical properties, for instance position or momentum, should receive a similar treatment when interpreted in the quantum realm. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that quantum dispositions should not be limited to probabilistic dispositions (propensities) by showing reasons why even possession of well-defined values of parameters should qualify as a dispositional property. I finally discuss the issue of the actuality of quantum dispositions, arguing that it may be justified to treat them as potentialities whose being has a lesser degree of reality than that of classical categorical properties, due to the incompatibility relations between non-commuting observables. (shrink)

This book uses the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals to analyze the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics. Counterfactual conditionals enter the analysis of quantum entangled systems in that they enable us to precisely formulate the locality condition that purports to exclude the existence of causal interactions between spatially separated parts of a system. They also make it possible to speak consistently about alternative measuring settings, and to explicate what is meant by quantum property attributions. The book develops the possible-world (...) semantics of quantum counterfactuals using David Lewis's famous approach as a starting point but modifying it significantly in order to achieve compatibility with the demands of the special theory of relativity as well as quantum mechanics. There have been several attempts to use counterfactuals semantics to strengthen Bell's theorem and its cognates such as the GHZ and Hardy theorems. These are critically evaluated in the book. Finally, a counterfactual reconstruction of the EPR argument and Bell's theorem is proposed that sheds a new light on their philosophical consequences regarding the relations between realism and local causation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting methodological naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation between science and religion. Methodological naturalism, denying supernatural and teleological explanations, influences the content of scientific theories, and in practice leads to vision of science as compatible with ontological naturalism and in opposition to theism. Ontological naturalism in turn justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism as the best method to know the reality. If we accept realistic interpretation (...) of scientific theories, then methodological naturalism conflicts science with religion. Theistic evolution does not seem to be a proper way to reconcile Darwinism and methodological naturalism with theism. Many of such propositions are boiled down to deism. Although evolution can be interpreted theistically, it is not the way in which majority of modern scientists and respectable scientific institutions understand it. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that enactivism and computationalism—two seemingly incompatible research traditions in modern cognitive science—can be fruitfully reconciled under the framework of the free energy principle. FEP holds that cognitive systems encode generative models of their niches and cognition can be understood in terms of minimizing the free energy of these models. There are two philosophical interpretations of this picture. A computationalist will argue that as FEP claims that Bayesian inference underpins both perception and action, it entails a (...) concept of cognition as a computational process. An enactivist, on the other hand, will point out that FEP explains cognitive systems as constantly self-organizing to non-equilibrium steady-state. My claim is that these two interpretations are both true at the same time and that they enlighten each other. (shrink)

Three basic positions regarding the nature of fundamental properties are: dispositional monism, categorical monism and the mixed view. Dispositional monism apparently involves a regress or circularity, while an unpalatable consequence of categorical monism and the mixed view is that they are committed to quidditism. I discuss Alexander Bird's defence of dispositional monism based on the structuralist approach to identity. I argue that his solution does not help standard dispositional essentialism, as it admits the possibility that two distinct dispositional properties can (...) possess the same stimuli and manifestations. Moreover, Bird's argument can be used to support the mixed view by relieving it of its commitment to quidditism. I briefly analyse an alternative defence of dispositional essentialism based on Leon Horsten's approach to the problem of circularity and impredicativity. I conclude that the best option is to choose Bird's solution but amend the dispositional perspective on properties. According to my proposal, the essences of dispositions are determined not directly by their stimuli and manifestations but by the role each property plays in the structure formed by the stimulus/manifestation relations. (shrink)

In this paper we present a tableau system for deontic logics with the operator of explicit permission. By means of this system the decidability of the considered logics can be proved. We will sketch how these logics are semantically defined by means of relating semantics and how they provide a simple solution to the free choice permission problem. In short, these logics employ relating implication and a certain propositional constant. These two are in turn used to define deontic operators similarly (...) as in Andersonian-Kangerian reduction, which uses different intensional implications and constants. (shrink)

In the first section of the chapter, I scrutinize Howard Stein’s 1991 definition of a transitive becoming relation that is Lorentz invariant. I argue first that Stein’s analysis gives few clues regarding the required characteristics of the relation complementary to his becoming—i.e. the relation of indefiniteness. It turns out that this relation cannot satisfy the condition of transitivity, and this fact can force us to reconsider the transitivity requirement as applied to the relation of becoming. I argue that the relation (...) of becoming need not be transitive, as long as it satisfies the weaker condition of “cumulativity”: for a given observer the area of the events that have become real should not diminish as time progresses. I show that there are actually two relations of becoming that meet this weakened condition: Stein’s (transitive) relation of causal past connectibility and the (non-transitive) relation that is the logical complement of the future causal connectibility. In the second part of the chapter I defend Stein’s notion of temporal becoming against the attack that appeals to quantum-mechanical non-locality. I critically evaluate the argument given by Mauro Dorato (1996) that purports to show that space-like separated measurements done on the EPR system have to be mutually determinate. Finally, in order to account for the truth of counterfactual statements that link the space-like separated outcomes, I propose a dynamic conception of becoming, according to which the sphere of determinate events as of a given point may depend on the physical phenomena transpiring at this point. (shrink)

We prove that all semisimple varieties of FL ew-algebras are discriminator varieties. A characterisation of discriminator and EDPC varieties of FL ew-algebras follows. It matches exactly a natural classification of logics over FL ew proposed by H. Ono.

Varieties like groups, rings, or Boolean algebras have the property that, in any of their members, the lattice of congruences is isomorphic to a lattice of more manageable objects, for example normal subgroups of groups, two-sided ideals of rings, filters (or ideals) of Boolean algebras.algebraic logic can explain these phenomena at a rather satisfactory level of generality: in every member A of a τ-regular variety ������ the lattice of congruences of A is isomorphic to the lattice of deductive filters on (...) A of the τ-assertional logic of ������. Moreover, if ������ has a constant 1 in its type and is 1-subtractive, the deductive filters on A ∈ ������ of the 1-assertional logic of ������ coincide with the ������-ideals of A in the sense of Gumm and Ursini, for which we have a manageable concept of ideal generation. However, there are isomorphism theorems, for example, in the theories of residuated lattices, pseudointerior algebras and quasi-MV algebras that cannot be subsumed by these general results. The aim of the present paper is to appropriately generalise the concepts of subtractivity and τ-regularity in such a way as to shed some light on the deep reason behind such theorems. The tools and concepts we develop hereby provide a common umbrella for the algebraic investigation of several families of logics, including substructural logics, modal logics, quantum logics, and logics of constructive mathematics. (shrink)

In the article the possibility of breaking the eigenvalue-eigenstate link in quantum mechanics is considered. An argument is presented to the effect that there are some non-maximal observables for which the implication from eigenstates to eigenvalues is not valid, i.e. such that although the probability of revealing certain value upon measurement is one, they don't possess this value before the measurement. It is shown that the existence of such observables leads to contextuality, i.e. the thesis that one Hermitean operator can (...) represent more than one physical observable. Finally, contextuality brought about by these considerations is compared with contextuality suggested by the Kochen-Specker paradox. (shrink)

This book contains a concise introduction to one of the most fundamental branches of philosophy, which deals with reality and its nature. Among the topics discussed are such metaphysical questions as "Are we fundamentally free?", "Does time really pass?", "Are there any abstract objects?", "What is causation?", "What are necessary and possible truths?". The book is aimed at absolute beginners, so it does not presuppose any previous knowledge of philosophy from the reader. For those who would like to pursue the (...) subject a bit deeper, the book comes equipped with an extended list of further reading. (shrink)

The paper reports our research aiming at utilization of human interactive communication modeling principles in application to a novel interaction paradigm designed for brain–computer/machine-interfacing (BCI/BMI) technologies as well as for socially aware intelligent environments or communication support systems. Automatic procedures for human affective responses or emotional states estimation are still a hot topic of contemporary research. We propose to utilize human brain and bodily physiological responses for affective/emotional as well as communicative interactivity estimation, which potentially could be used in the (...) future for human–machine/environment interaction design. As a test platform for such an intelligent human–machine communication application, an emotional stimuli paradigm was chosen to evaluate brain responses to various affective stimuli in an emotional empathy mode. Videos with moving faces expressing various emotional displays as well as speech stimuli with similarly emotionally articulated sentences are presented to the subjects in order to further analyze different affective responses. From information processing point of view, several challenges with multimodal signal conditioning and stimuli dynamic response extraction in time frequency domain are addressed. Emotions play an important role in human daily life and human-to-human communication. This is why involvement of affective stimuli principles to human–machine communication or machine-mediated communication with utilization of multichannel neurophysiological and periphery physiological signals monitoring techniques, allowing real-time subjective brain responses evaluation, is discussed. We present our preliminary results and discuss potential applications of brain/body affective responses estimation for future interactive/smart environments. (shrink)

This paper aims to inquire whether an analysis of the concept of law is an exercise of analysis in its modest or immodest form. Our inquiry suggests that the Jacksonian distinction between modest and immodest conceptual analysis, so eagerly applied by many legal scholars, is inapplicable to analyzing a specific part of the concept of law. The crux of our argument lies in the relation between the folk theory of law and the content of the developed concept of law. As (...) an artifact concept, the concept of law must depend on the pre-existing content of the folk conception of law (which we term the ‘foundational folk theory’). This part of folk theory determines the collective intentionality necessary to bring an institutional artifact, such as law, into existence. A large part of the argument for this conclusion depends on the acceptance of a realist and functional, post-Searlean theory of artifactual types. (shrink)

The frustration in Polish society arising from excessive costs of conducting court proceedings and lengthy delays for dispute resolution has resulted in a genuine limitation in access to judicial justice for citizens. This paper argues that the answer to the dilemma between ensuring both justice and efficiency lies in language being a tool for the active participation of the parties in building mutual trust and shaping solutions in conflictual circumstances. How should the postulate of effective communication leading to dispute resolution (...) in modern justice be achieved? The authors present the advantages of oral communication in proceedings on the way to finding agreement, pointing out the content and quality of language that make dispute resolution possible. (shrink)

Am(B m B). Specifically I was wondering whether for every BCI-provable formula A there is a B for which the inset formula was provable. If you want to read about this issue, which I..

Cet article est un exposé des aspects ontologiques de la philosophie de Descartes à la lumière de l’ontologie existentielle et formelle de Roman Ingarden. Descartes pose le problème philosophique de ce qui est réel et tente de le résoudre conformément à la tradition en introduisant la problématique de la substance. La substance est une clé de voûte de la philosophie de Descartes qui fonctionne à différents niveaux de sa pensée comme une tentative de connexion de l’existence du réel et de (...) l’idéel. La problématique de la substance comprend des questions existentielles, où la substance est traitée comme catégorie, puis relève de l’ontologie formelle, où la substance fonctionne comme une quasi-nature catégoriale, qui permet de distinguer les différents domaines de la réalité. La substance comme catégorie se caractérise par (a) l’autosuffisance ontique ; (b) l’indépendance, qui s’associe à l’exclusion ontique, (c) la durabilité ontique, pour enfin être traitée comme (d) chose existante ( res existens ). Deuxièmement, la notion de substance comme étant sujet des propriétés ( hypokeimenon ) conduit à la reconnaître comme une quasi-nature constitutive, qui ensuite est prise en compte dans chacun des trois types de substances : Dieu, res cogitans et res extensa. (shrink)

A one-premiss rule is said to be archetypal for a consequence relation when not only is the conclusion of any application of the rule a consequence of the premiss, but whenever one formula has another as a consequence, these formulas are respectively equivalent to a premiss and a conclusion of some application of the rule. We are concerned here with the consequence relation of classical propositional logic and with the task of extending the above notion of archetypality to rules with (...) more than one premiss, and providing an informative characterization of the set of rules falling under the more general notion. (shrink)

There could be accepted an ontological model, in which every thing is identified with properties possessed by it. This study is an attempt at matematization of the concept of property. Axiomatization was conducted so that this concept could be compatible, to a maximum degree, with institutional understanding. The main result is assertion 11 due to its methodological consequences. A collection of all objects discernible with regard to the finite number of independent properties was called "space of jumps" (formal definitions of (...) "independence" and "space of jumps" are given in the article). "Space of jumps" may be treated as a certain model of "possible world". The assertions contained in the article give its characterization. By way of simplifying, the assertion 11 can be expressed as follows: accepting that a man s cognition takes place through a finite number of senses, which recognize basic and independent properties, it can be stated that a man cannot recognize objects possessing properties independent of properties recognizable through senses. (shrink)

The subject of the paper is a polemic between Leonard Nelson and Ernst Cassirer mainly concerning the understanding of the critical method in philosophy. Nelson refutes the accusation of psychologism and attacks the core of the philosophy of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. In response to those allegations, Cassirer feels obliged to defend the position of his masters and performs this task brilliantly. The present paper considers similarities and differences in the positions of both sides in this debate. I try (...) to evaluate the arguments of both sides and argue that they took basically the same positions, while the existing discrepancies did not justify such an intense polemic. If the disputing sides had approached the discussion in a less emotional way, it could have led to substantive and interesting conclusions. (shrink)

It is proved that free dynamic algebras superamalgamate. Craig interpolation for propositional dynamic logic and superamalgamation for the variety of dynamic algebras follow.

Braddon-Mitchell and Miller put forward the claim that the relation of being-the-same-person is gradable: a person can be the same person tomorrow as today, but only half the same. To justify their thesis, they propose a model of persons that is intended to be metaphysically neutral. This article sets out to show that such a model implicitly contains strong metaphysical assumptions that run contrary to the authors’ own statements. Using Roman Ingarden’s phenomenological ontology, we aim to demonstrate that within the (...) model in question persons exist intentionally, where this leads to a caricature rather than an adequate account of persons. In opposition to Braddon-Mitchell and Miller, we argue that the justification presented for the thesis of the gradability of the relation of being-the-same-person in fact makes it reasonable to demand that an adequate model of persons be posited. We present Kurt Lewin’s holistic topological-dynamic model, and show that in this context it is not being-the-same-person that is gradable, but rather the characteristic (of persons) that is dimension. Thus, we reject the thesis of the gradability of the relation of being-the-same-person involved in personal identity. (shrink)

Th e lecture elucidates and compares Johannes Volkelt’s and Heinrich Rickert’s positions on the problem of metaphysics. It comes to a reference of views representative of the metaphysical approach of early neo-Kantian Johannes Volkelt to representative of Baden School of late New-Kantian, Heinrich Rickert. In the lecture I would like to make the reconstruction and the analysis of philosophies of Volkelt and Rickert in the context of the problem of metaphysics. Th e object is the content, premises and consequences of (...) their philosophy in comparison to New-Kantian and other philosophy. Th e basis for the reconstruction is their expressions in their various writings. Th e purpose is the analysis of the transformation of western metaphysics and their infl uence on the contemporary thinking about the world. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to discuss primarily the epistemological theory of reflection as seen by Heinrich Rickert, the main representative of Neo-Kantianism Baden School. The most important arguments put forward by Rickert against taking the cognition as a reflection of the reality are being analysed. Rickert’s standpoint turns out to be moderate. He argues against the transcendental theory of reflection, but does not reject the idea of reflection as a model of cognition and takes the immanent theory of (...) reflection as relatively justified. The paper contains also a discussion of the standpoint of another representative of Baden School, Emil Lask, who has rejected the theory of reflection in favour of the after-image theory. (shrink)

The paper deals with Gerold Prauss’s critique of cognition taken as reflection of the surrounding reality in the consciousness of the agent. The results of his critique are similar to the standpoint presented earlier by Neo-Kantians. Prauss’s original contribution to the debate on theory of reflection consists in distinction between materialistic and non-materialistic theories of reflection, as well as in his argumentation basing on the notion of clarity.

The paper is devoted to an analysis of the epistemology of Johannes Volkelt, its main arguments and the relation of Volkelt's theory of certainty to Kant and other contemporary philosophers, such as Edmund Husserl. Volkelt's problem of scepticism is closely related to the positivist principle, which aimed at limiting all knowledge to our individual sphere of representations. This principle in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason means the unknowableness of the thing in itself. Volkelt seeks for answer to the question about (...) the trans-subjective knowledge. He finds a basis for the certainty in the dispresuppositional theory of the transsubjective minimum. The acceptance of the trans-subjective minimum determines too the possibility of metaphysics. (shrink)